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Abstract. We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where
advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given
period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constraint, as well as a max-
imum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for
a particular search.
We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try
to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addi-
tion, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism is not truthful,
but has a Nash equilibrium whose outcome is identical to our mechanism.
As far as we can tell, this is the first treatment of sponsored search that
directly incorporates both multiple slots and budget constraints into an
analysis of incentives.
Our mechanism employs a descending-price auction that maintains a
solution to a certain machine scheduling problem whose job lengths de-
pend on the price, and hence is variable over the auction. The price stops
when the set of bidders that can afford that price pack exactly into a
block of ad slots, at which point the mechanism allocates that block and
continues on the remaining slots. To prove our result on the equilibrium
of the revenue-maximizing mechanism, we first show that a greedy algo-
rithm suffices to solve the revenue-maximizing linear program; we then
use this insight to prove that bidders allocated in the same block of our
mechanism have no incentive to deviate from bidding the fixed price of
that block.
⋆ This work was done while the author was visiting Google, Inc., New York, NY.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search is an increasingly important advertising medium, attracting
a wide variety of advertisers, large and small. When a user sends a query to a
search engine, the advertisements are placed into slots, usually arranged linearly
down the page. These slots have a varying degree of exposure, often measured
in terms of the probability that the ad will be clicked; a common model is that
the higher ads tend to attract more clicks. The problem of allocating these slots
to bidders has been addressed in various ways. The most common method is to
allocate ads to each search independently via a generalized second price (GSP)
auction, where the ads are ranked by (some function of) their bid, and placed
into the slots in rank order. (See [18] for a survey of this area.)
There are several important aspects of sponsored search not captured by the
original models. Most advertisers are interested in getting many clicks through-
out the day on a variety of searches, not just a specific slot on a particular
search query. Also, many advertisers have budget constraints, where they do not
allow the search engine to spend more than their budget during the day. Finally,
search engines may have some knowledge about the distribution of queries that
will occur during the day, and so should be able to make more efficient allocation
decisions than just simple ranking.
The Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem is this: given a set of bidders with
bids (per click) and budgets (per day), and a set of slots over the entire day where
we know the expected number of clicks in each slot, find a schedule that places
bidders into slots. The schedule must not place a bidder into two different slots
at the same time. In addition, we must find a price for each bidder that does not
exceed the bidder’s budget constraint, nor their per-click bid. (See Section 1.3
for a formal statement of the problem.)
A good algorithm for this problem will have high revenue. Also, we would
like the algorithm to be truthful; i.e., each bidder will be incented to report her
true bid and budget. In order to prove something like this, we need a utility
function for the bidder that captures the degree to which she is happy with her
allocation. Natural models in this context (with clicks, bids and budgets) are
click-maximization—where she wishes to maximize her number of clicks subject
to her personal bid and budget constraints, or profit-maximization—where she
wishes to maximize her profit (clicks × profit per click). In this paper we focus
on click-maximization.3
We present an efficient mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling and prove
that it is truthful. We also prove that the revenue-optimal mechanism for Offline
3 Our choice is in part motivated by the presence of budgets, which have a natural
interpretation in this application: if an overall advertising campaign allocates a fixed
portion of its budget to online media, then the agent responsible for that budget is
incented to spend the entire budget to maximize exposure. In contrast, under the
profit-maximizing utility, a weak motivation for budgets is a limit on liquidity. Also,
our choice of utility function is out of analytical necessity: Borgs et al. [4] show that
under some reasonable assumptions, truthful mechanisms are impossible under a
profit-maximizing utility.
Ad Slot Scheduling is not truthful, but has a Nash equilibrium (under the same
utility model) whose outcome is equivalent to our mechanism; this result is
strong evidence that our mechanism has desirable revenue properties. Our results
generalize to a model where each bidder has a personal click-through-rate that
multiplies her click probability.
As far as we can tell, this is the first treatment of sponsored search that
directly incorporates both multiple positions and budget constraints into an
analysis of incentives (see Section 1.2 for a survey of related work). In its full
generality, the problem of sponsored search is more complex than our model;
e.g., since the query distribution is noisy, good allocation strategies need to be
online and adaptive. Also, our mechanism is designed for a single query type,
whereas advertisers are interested in enforcing their budget across multiple query
types. However, the tools used in this paper may be valuable for deriving more
general mechanisms in the future.
1.1 Methods and Results. A natural mechanism forOffline Ad Slot Schedul-
ing is the following: find a feasible schedule and a set of prices that maximizes
revenue, subject to the bidders’ constraints. It is straightforward to derive a
linear program for this optimization problem, but unfortunately this is not a
truthful mechanism (see Example 1 in Section 2). However, there is a direct
truthful mechanism—the price-setting mechanism we present in this paper—
that results in the same outcome as an equilibrium of the revenue-maximizing
mechanism.
We derive this mechanism (and prove that it is truthful) by starting with
the single-slot case in Section 2, where two extreme cases have natural, instruc-
tive interpretations. With only bids (and unlimited budgets), a winner-take-all
mechanism works; with only budgets (and unlimited bids) the clicks are simply
divided up in proportion to budgets. Combining these ideas in the right way re-
sults in a natural descending-price mechanism, where the price (per click) stops
at the point where the bidders who can afford that price have enough budget to
purchase all of the clicks.
Generalizing to multiple slots requires understanding the structure of feasi-
ble schedules, even in the special budgets-only case. In Section 3 we solve the
budgets-only case by characterizing the allowable schedules in terms of the so-
lution to a classical machine scheduling problem (to be precise, the problem
Q | pmtn | Cmax [13]). The difficulty that arises is that the lengths of the jobs
in the scheduling problem actually depend on the price charged. Thus, we in-
corporate the scheduling algorithm into a descending-price mechanism, where
the price stops at the point where the scheduling constraints are tight; at this
point a block of slots is allocated at a fixed uniform price (dividing the clicks
equally by budget) and the mechanism iterates. We present the full mechanism
in Section 4 by incorporating bids analogously to the single-slot case: the price
descends until the set of bidders that can afford that price has enough budget
to make the scheduling constraints tight. A tricky case arises when a new bidder
appears whose budget violates the scheduling constraints; in this case the bud-
get of this “threshold” bidder is reduced to make them tight again. Finally in
Section 4.2 we show that the revenue-optimal mechanism has a Nash equilibrium
whose outcome is identical to our mechanism. This follows from the fact that if
all the bidders in a block declare a bid (roughly) equal to the price of the block,
nobody has an incentive to deviate, since every bidder is charged exactly her
bid, and the clicks are divided up equally by budget.
1.2 Related Work. There are some papers on sponsored search that analyze
the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, which is the auction currently in use
at Google and Yahoo. The equilibria of this auction are characterized and com-
pared with VCG [9, 17, 2, 22]. Here the utility function is the profit-maximizing
utility where each bidder attempts to maximize her clicks × profit per click, and
budget constraints are generally not treated.
Borgs et al. [4] consider the problem of budget-constrained bidders for mul-
tiple items of a single type, with a utility function that is profit-maximizing,
modulo being under the budget (being over the budget gives an unbounded neg-
ative utility). They give a truthful mechanism allocating some portion of the
items that is revenue-optimal, and prove that in their model, under reasonable
assumptions, truthful mechanisms that allocate all the units are impossible. Our
work is different both because of the different utility function and the general-
ization to multiple slots with a scheduling constraint. Using related methods,
Mahdian et al. [19] consider an online setting where an unknown number of
copies of an item arrive online, and give a truthful mechanism with a constant
competitive ratio guarantee.
There is some work on algorithms for allocating bidders with budgets to
keywords that arrive online, where the bidders place (possibly different) bids
on particular keywords [20, 19]. The application of this work is similar to ours,
but their concern is purely online optimization; they do not consider the game-
theoretic aspects of the allocation. Abrams et al. [1] derive a linear program
for the offline optimization problem of allocating bidders to queries, and handle
multiple positions by using variables for “slates” of bidders. Their LP is related
to ours, but again they do not consider game-theoretic aspects of their proposed
allocations.
Bidder strategies for keyword auctions in the presence of budget constraints
have also been considered [11, 21, 6, 5]. Generally these papers are not concerned
with mechanism design, but there could be some interesting relationships be-
tween the models in these papers and the one we study here.
In our setting one is tempted to apply a Fisher Marketmodel: herem divisible
goods are available to n buyers with money Bi, and uij(x) denotes i’s utility of
receiving x amount of good j. It is known [3, 10, 7] that under certain conditions
a vector of prices for goods exists such that the market clears, in that there is no
surplus of goods, and all the money is spent. Furthermore, this price vector can
be found efficiently [8]. The natural way to apply a Fisher model to a slot auction
is to regard the slots as commodities and have the utilities be in proportion to
the number of clicks. However this becomes problematic because there does not
seem to be a way to encode the scheduling constraints in the Fisher model; this
constraint could make an apparently “market-clearing” equilibrium infeasible,
and indeed plays a central role in our investigations.
1.3 Our Setting. We define the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem as fol-
lows. We have n > 1 bidders interested in clicks. Each bidder i has a budget
Bi and a maximum cost-per-click (max-cpc) mi. Given a number of clicks ci,
and a price per click p, the utility ui of bidder i is ci if both the true max-cpc
and the true budget are satisfied, and −∞ otherwise. In other words, ui = ci
if p ≤ mi and cip ≤ Bi; and ui = −∞ otherwise. We have n
′ advertising
slots where slot i receives Di clicks during the time interval [0, 1]. We assume
D1 > D2 > . . . > Dn′ .
In a schedule, each bidder is assigned to a set of (slot, time interval) pairs
(j, [α, β)), where j ≤ n′ and 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1. A feasible schedule is one where no
more than one bidder is assigned to a slot at any given time, and no bidder is
assigned to more than one slot at any given time. (Formally, the intervals for a
particular slot do not overlap, and the intervals for a particular bidder do not
overlap.) A feasible schedule can be applied as follows: when a user query comes
at some time α ∈ [0, 1], the schedule for that time instant is used to populate the
ad slots. If we assume that clicks come at a constant rate throughout the interval
[0, 1], the number of clicks a bidder is expected to receive from a schedule is the
sum of (β − α)Dj over all pairs (j, [α, β)) in its schedule.
4
A mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling takes as input a declared budget
Bi and declared max-cpc (the “bid”) bi, and returns a feasible schedule, as well
as a price per click pi ≤ bi for each bidder. The schedule gives some number ci
of clicks to each bidder i that must respect the budget at the given price; i.e.,
we have pici ≤ Bi.
The revenue of a mechanism is
∑
i pici. We say a mechanism is truthful if it
is a weakly dominant strategy to declare one’s true budget and max-cpc; i.e., for
any particular bidder i, given any set of bids and budgets declared by the other
bidders, declaring her true budget Bi and max-cpc mi maximizes her utility ui.
A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium is a set of declared bids and budgets such
that no bidder wants to change her declaration of bid or budget, given that all
other declarations stay fixed. An ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a set of bids and budgets
where no bidder can increase her utility by more than ǫ by changing her bid or
budget.
Throughout the paper we assume some arbitrary lexicographic ordering on
the bidders, that does not necessarily match the subscripts. When we compare
two bids bi and bi′ we say that bi ≻ bi′ iff either bi > bi′ , or bi = bi′ but i occurs
first lexicographically.
2 One Slot Case
In this section we consider the case k = 1, where there is only one advertising
slot, with some number D := D1 of clicks. We will derive a truthful mechanism
4 All our results generalize to the setting where each bidder i has a “click-through
rate” γi and receives (β−α)γiDj clicks (see Section 5). We leave this out for clarity.
for this case by first considering the two extreme cases of infinite bids and infinite
budgets. The proofs of the theorems in this section are in Appendix A.
Suppose all budgets Bi = ∞. Then, our input amounts to bids b1 ≻ b2 ≻
. . . ≻ bn. Our mechanism is simply to give all the clicks to the highest bidder.
We charge bidder 1 her full price p1 = b1. We claim that reporting the truth is
a weakly dominant strategy for this mechanism. Clearly all bidders will report
bi ≤ mi, since the price is set to bi if they win. The losing bidders cannot gain
from decreasing bi. The winning bidder can lower her price by lowering bi, but
this will not gain her any more clicks, since she is already getting all D of them.
Now suppose all bids bi =∞. In this case, our input is just a set of budgets
B1, . . . , Bn, and we need to allocate D clicks, with no ceiling on the per-click
price. Here we apply a simple rule related to pricing schemes for network band-
width (see [16, 15]): Let B =
∑
iBi. Now to each bidder i, allocate (Bi/B)D
clicks. Set all prices the same: pi = p = B/D. The mechanism guarantees that
each bidder exactly spends her budget, thus no bidder will report B′i > Bi. Now
suppose some bidder reports B′i = Bi −∆, for ∆ > 0. Then this bidder is allo-
cated D(Bi −∆)/(B −∆) clicks, which is less than D(Bi/B), since n > 1 and
all Bi > 0.
2.1 Greedy First-Price Mechanism. A natural mechanism for the general
single-slot case is to solve the associated “fractional knapsack” problem, and
charge bidders their bid; i.e., starting with the highest bidder, greedily add bid-
ders to the allocation, charging them their bid, until all the clicks are allocated.
We refer to this as the greedy first-price (GFP) mechanism. Though natural (and
revenue-maximizing as a function of bids) this mechanism is easily seen to be
not truthful:
Example 1. Suppose there are two bidders and D = 120 clicks. Bidder 1 has (m1 = $2,
B1 = $100) and bidder 2 has (m2 = $1, B2 = $50). In the GFP mechanism, if both
bidders tell the truth, then bidder 1 gets 50 clicks for $2 each, and 50 of the remaining
70 clicks go to bidder 2 for $1 each. However, if bidder 1 instead declares b1 = $1 + ǫ,
then she gets (roughly) 100 clicks, and bidder 2 is left with (roughly) 20 clicks.
The problem here is that the high bidders can get away with bidding lower,
thus getting a lower price. The difference between this and the unlimited-budget
case above is that a lower price now results in more clicks. It turns out that in
equilibrium, this mechanism will result in an allocation where a prefix of the top
bidders are allocated, but their prices equalize to (roughly) the lowest bid in the
prefix (as in the example above).
2.2 The Price-Setting Mechanism. An equilibrium allocation of GFP can
be computed directly via the following mechanism, which we refer to as the
price-setting (PS) mechanism. Essentially this is a descending price mechanism:
the price stops descending when the bidders willing to pay at that price have
enough budget to purchase all the clicks. We have to be careful at the moment
a bidder is added to the pool of the willing bidders; if this new bidder has a
large enough budget, then suddenly the willing bidders have more than enough
budget to pay for all of the clicks. To compensate, the mechanism decreases this
“threshold” bidder’s effective budget until the clicks are paid for exactly. We
formalize the mechanism as follows:
Price-Setting (PS) Mechanism (Single Slot)
• Assume wlog that b1 ≻ b2 ≻ . . . ≻ bn ≥ 0.
• Let k be the first bidder such that bk+1 ≤
∑k
i=1Bi/D. Compute price
p = min{
∑k
i=1 Bi/D, bk}.
• Allocate Bi/p clicks to each i ≤ k− 1. Allocate Bˆk/p clicks to bidder k,
where Bˆk = pD −
∑k−1
i=1 Bi.
Example 2. Suppose there are three bidders with b1 = $2, b2 = $1, b3 = $0.25 and
B1 = $100, B2 = $50, B3 = $80, and D = 300 clicks. Running the PS mechanism, we
get k = 2 since B1/D = 1/3 < b2 = $1, but (B1 + B2)/D = $0.50 ≥ b3 = $0.25. The
price is set to min{$0.50, $1} = $0.50, and bidders 1 and 2 get 200 and 100 clicks at
that price, respectively. There is no threshold bidder.
Example 3. Suppose now bidder 2 changes her bid to b2 = $0.40 (everything else
remains the same as Example 2). We still get k = 2 since B1/D = 1/3 < b2 = $0.40.
But now the price is set to min{$0.50, $0.40} = $0.40, and bidders 1 and 2 get 250 and
50 clicks at that price, respectively. Note that bidder 2 is now a threshold bidder, does
not use her entire budget, and gets fewer clicks.
Note that this mechanism reduces to the given mechanisms in the spe-
cial cases of infinite bids or budgets (with the proper treatment of infinite
bids/budgets).
Theorem 1. The price-setting mechanism (single slot) is truthful.
2.3 Price-Setting Mechanism Computes Nash Equilibrium of GFP.
Consider the greedy first-price auction in which the highest bidder receivesB1/b1
clicks, the secondB2/b2 clicks and so on, until the supply ofD clicks is exhausted.
It is immediate that truthfully reporting budgets is a dominant strategy in this
mechanism, since when a bidder is considered, her reported budget is exhausted
as much as possible, at a fixed price. However, reporting bi = mi is not a dom-
inant strategy. Nevertheless, it turns out that GFP has an equilibrium whose
outcome is (roughly) the same as the PS mechanism. One cannot show that there
is a plain Nash equilibrium because of the way ties are resolved lexicographically;
the following example illustrates why.
Example 4. Suppose we have the same instance as example 1: two bidders, D = 120
clicks, (m1 = $2, B1 = $100) and (m2 = $1, B2 = $50). But now suppose that bidder 2
occurs first lexicographically. In GFP, if bidder 2 tells the truth, and bidder 1 declares
b1 = $1, then bidder 2 will get chosen first (since she is first lexicographically), and
take 50 clicks. Bidder 2 will end up with the remaining 70 clicks. However, if bidder 1
instead declares b1 = $1 + ǫ for some ǫ > 0, then she gets 100/(1 + ǫ) clicks. But this
is not a best response, since she could bid 1 + ǫ/2 and get slightly more clicks.
Thus, we prove instead that the bidders reach an ǫ-Nash equilibrium:
Theorem 2. Suppose the PS mechanism is run on the truthful input, resulting
in price p and clicks c1, . . . , cn for each bidder. Then, for any ǫ > 0 there is
a pure-strategy ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the GFP mechanism where each bidder
receives ci ± ǫ clicks.
3 Multiple Slots: Bids or Budgets Only
Generalizing to multiple slots makes the scheduling constraint nontrivial. Now
instead of splitting a pool of D clicks arbitrarily, we need to assign clicks that
correspond to a feasible schedule of bidders to slots. The conditions under which
this is possible add a complexity that we characterize and incorporate into our
mechanism in this section.
As in the single-slot case it will be instructive to consider first the cases of
infinite bids or budgets. Suppose all Bi =∞. In this case, the input consists of
bids only b1 ≻ b2 ≻ . . . ≻ bn. Naturally, what we do here is rank by bid, and
allocate the slots to the bidders in that order. Since each budget is infinite, we
can always set the prices pi equal to the bids bi. By the same logic as in the
single-slot case, this is easily seen to be truthful. In the other case, when bi =∞,
there is a lot more work to do, and we devote the remainder of the section to
this case.
Without loss of generality, we may assume the number of slots equals the
number of bids (i.e., n′ = n); if this is not the case, then we add dummy bidders
with Bi = bi = 0, or dummy slots with Di = 0, as appropriate. We keep this
assumption for the remainder of the paper. The proofs of the theorems in this
section are in Appendix B.
3.1 Assigning slots using a classical scheduling algorithm. First we
give an important lemma that characterizes the conditions under which a set of
bidders can be allocated to a set of slots, which turns out to be just a restatement
of a classical result [14] from scheduling theory.
Lemma 1. Suppose we would like to assign an arbitrary set {1, . . . , k} of bidders
to a set of slots {1, . . . , k} with D1 > . . . > Dk. Then, a click allocation c1 ≥
... ≥ ck is feasible iff
c1 + . . .+ cℓ ≤ D1 + . . .+Dℓ for all ℓ = 1, ..., k. (1)
Proof. In scheduling theory, we say a job with service requirement x is a task
that needs x/s units of time to complete on a machine with speed s. The question
of whether there is a feasible allocation is equivalent to the following scheduling
problem: Given k jobs with service requirements xi = ci, and k machines with
speeds si = Di, is there a schedule of jobs to machines (with preemption allowed)
that completes in one unit of time?
As shown in [14], the optimal schedule for this problem (a.k.a. Q|pmtn|Cmax)
can be found efficiently by the level algorithm,5 and the schedule completes in
time maxℓ≤k{
∑ℓ
i=1 xi/
∑ℓ
i=1 si}. Thus, the conditions of the lemma are exactly
the conditions under which the schedule completes in one unit of time. ⊓⊔
5 In later work, Gonzalez and Sahni [12] give a faster (linear-time) algorithm.
3.2 A multiple-slot budgets-only mechanism. Our mechanism will roughly
be a descending-price mechanism where we decrease the price until a prefix of
budgets fits tightly into a prefix of positions at that price, whereupon we allocate
that prefix, and continue to decrease the price for the remaining bidders.
The following subroutine, which will be used in our mechanism (and later
in the general mechanism), takes a set of budgets and determines a prefix of
positions that can be packed tightly with the largest budgets at a uniform price
p. The routine ensures that all the clicks in those positions are sold at price p,
and all the allocated bidders spend their budget exactly.
Routine “Find-Price-Block”
Input: Set of n bidders, set of n slots with D1 > D2 > . . . > Dn.
• If all Di = 0, assign bidders to slots arbitrarily and exit.
• Sort the bidders by budget and assume wlog that B1 ≥ B2 ≥ ... ≥ Bn.
• Define rℓ =
∑ℓ
i=1 Bi/
∑ℓ
i=1Di. Set price p = maxℓ rℓ.
• Let ℓ∗ be the largest ℓ such that rℓ = p. Allocate slots {1, . . . ℓ
∗} to
bidders {1, . . . , ℓ∗} at price p, using all of their budgets; i.e., ci := Bi/p.
Note that in the last step the allocation is always possible since for all ℓ ≤ ℓ∗, we
have p ≥ rℓ =
∑ℓ
i=1Bi/
∑ℓ
i=1Di, which rewritten is
∑ℓ
i=1 ci ≤
∑ℓ
i=1Di, and so
we can apply Lemma 1. Now we are ready to give the mechanism in terms of
this subroutine; an example run is shown in Figure 1.
Price-Setting Mechanism (Multiple Slots, Budgets Only)
• Run “Find-Price-Block” on bidders 1, . . . , n, and slots 1, . . . , n. This
gives an allocation of ℓ∗ bidders to the first ℓ∗ slots.
• Repeat on the remaining bidders and slots until all slots are allocated.
Let p1, p2, . . . be the prices used for each successive block assigned by the al-
gorithm. We claim that p1 > p2 > . . .; to see this, note then when p1 is set,
we have p1 = rk and p1 > rℓ for all ℓ > k, where k is the last bidder in
the block. Thus for all ℓ > k, we have p1
∑
j≤ℓDj >
∑
i≤ℓ Bj , which gives
p1
∑
k<j≤ℓDj >
∑
k<i≤ℓ Bj using p1 = rk. This implies that when we apply
Find-Price-Block the second time, we get r′ℓ =
∑
k<i≤ℓBj/
∑
k<j≤ℓDj < p1,
and so p2 < p1. This argument applies to successive blocks to give p1 > p2 > . . ..
Theorem 3. The price-setting mechanism (multiple slots, budgets only) is truth-
ful.
4 Main Results
In this section we give our main results, presenting our price-setting mechanism
in the general case, building on the ideas in the previous two sections. We begin in
Section 4.1 by stating the mechanism and showing some examples, then proving
that the mechanism is truthful. In Section 4.2 we analyze the revenue-optimal
PSfrag replacements
Bidder Budget
1
2
3
4
$80
$70
$20
$1
3/5
2/5
20/21
1/21
D1 = 100
D2 = 50
D3 = 25
D4 = 0
p1 = $1.00
p2 = $0.84
Fig. 1. An example of the PS mechanism (multiple slots, budgets only). We have
four slots with D1, . . . , D4 clicks as shown, and four bidders with declared budgets
as shown. The first application of Find-Price-Block computes r1 = B1/D1 = 80/100,
r2 = (B1+B2)/(D1+D2) = 150/150, r3 = (B1+B2+B3)/(D1+D2+D3) = 170/175,
r4 = (B1 + B2 + B3 + B4)/(D1 + D2 + D3 + D4) = 171/175. Since r2 is largest, the
top two slots make up the first price block with a price p1 = r2 = $1; bidder 1 gets
80 clicks and bidder 2 gets 70 clicks, using the schedule as shown. In the second price
block, we get B3/D3 = 20/25 and (B3 + B4)/(D3 + D4) = 21/25. Thus p2 is set to
21/25 = $0.84, bidder 3 gets 500/21 clicks and bidder 4 gets 25/21 clicks, using the
schedule as shown.
schedule, and show that it can be computed with a generalization of the greedy
first-price (GFP) mechanism. We then show that GFP has an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
whose outcome is identical to the general PS mechanism. The proofs of the
theorems in this section are in Appendix C.
4.1 The Price-Setting Mechanism (General Case). The generalization
of the PS mechanism combines the ideas from the bids-and-budgets version of
the single slot mechanism with the budgets-only version of the multiple-slot
mechanism. As our price descends, we maintain a set of “active” bidders with
bids at or above this price, as in the single-slot mechanism. These active bidders
are kept ranked by budget, and when the price reaches the point where a prefix of
bidders fits into a prefix of slots (as in the budgets-only mechanism) we allocate
them and repeat. As in the single-slot case, we heave to be careful when a bidder
enters the active set and suddenly causes an over-fit; in this case we again reduce
the budget of this “threshold” bidder until it fits. We formalize this as follows:
Price-Setting Mechanism (General Case)
(i) Assume wlog that b1 ≻ b2 ≻ . . . ≻ bn = 0.
(ii) Let k be the first bidder such that running Find-Price-Block on bidders
1, . . . , k would result in a price p ≥ bk+1.
(iii) Reduce Bk until running Find-Price-Block on bidders 1, . . . , k would
result in a price p ≤ bk. Apply this allocation, which for some ℓ
∗ ≤ k gives
the first ℓ∗ slots to the ℓ∗ bidders among 1 . . . k with the largest budgets.
(iv) Repeat on the remaining bidders and slots.
An example run of this mechanism is shown in Figure 2. Since the PS mechanism
sets prices per slot, it is natural to ask if these prices constitute some sort of
“market-clearing” equilibrium in the spirit of a Fisher market. The quick answer
is no: since the price per click increases for higher slots, and each bidder values
clicks at each slot equally, then bidders will always prefer the bottom slot. Note
that by the same logic as the budgets-only mechanism, the prices p1, p2, . . . for
each price block strictly decrease.
PSfrag replacements
BidderBudget Bid
1
2
3
4
$3
$0.75
$1
$0.50
$80
$70
$20
$1
29/45
16/45
D1 = 100
D2 = 50
D3 = 25
D4 = 0
p1 = $0.80
p2 = $0.75
p3 = $0
Fig. 2. Consider the same bidders and slots as in Figure 1, but now add bids as shown.
Running Find-Price-Block on only bidder 1 gives a price of r1 = 80/100, which is less
than the next bid of $1. So, we run Find-Price-Block on bidders 1 and 3 (the next-
highest bid), giving r1 = 80/100 and r2 = 100/150. We still get a price of $0.80, but
now this is more than the next-highest bid of $0.75, so we allocate the first bidder to
the first slot at a price of $0.80. We are left with bidders 2-4 and slots 2-4. With just
bidder 3 (the highest bidder) and slot 2, we get a price p = 20/50 which is less than
the next-highest bid of $0.75, so we consider bidders 2 and 3 on slots 2 and 3. This
gives a price of max{70/50, 90/75} = $1.40, which is more than $0.50. Since this is
also more than $0.75, we must lower B2 until the price is exactly $0.75, which makes
B′2 = $36.25. With this setting of B
′
2, Find-Price-Block allocates bidders 2 and 3 to
slots 2 and 3, giving 75(36.25/56.25) and 75(20/56.25) clicks respectively, at a price of
$0.75 per click. Bidder 4 is allocated to slot 4, receiving zero clicks.
Efficiency. So far we have been largely ignoring the efficiency of computing
the allocation in the PS mechanism. It is immediately clear that the general
PS mechanism can be executed in time polynomial in n and log(1/ǫ) to some
precision ǫ using binary search and linear programming.
In fact, a purely combinatorial O(n2) time algorithm is possible. As bidders
get added in step (ii), maintaining a sorted list of bidders and budgets can be
done in time O(n logn). Thus it remains to show that running Find-Price-Block
(and computing the reduced budget) can be done in O(n) time given these sorted
lists. In Find-Price-Block, computing the ratios rℓ can be done in linear time.
Finding the allocation from Lemma 1 can also be done in linear time using the
Gonzalez-Sahni algorithm [12] for scheduling related parallel machines (in fact
the total time for scheduling can be made O(n) since each slot is scheduled
only once). Finally, computing the reduced budget is a simple calculation on
each relevant ratio rℓ, also doable in linear time. We suspect that there is a
O(n · polylog(n)) algorithm using a more elaborate data structure; we leave this
open.
Theorem 4. The price-setting mechanism (general case) is truthful.
4.2 Greedy First-Price Mechanism for Multiple Slots. In the general
case, as in the single-slot case, there is a natural greedy first-price mechanism
when the bidding language includes both bids and budgets: Order the bidders
by bid b1 ≻ b2 ≻ . . . ≻ bn. Starting from the highest bidder, for each bidder i
compute the maximum possible number of clicks ci that one could allocate to
bidder i at price bi, given the budget constraint Bi and the commitments to
previous bidders c1, . . . , ci−1. This reduces to the “fractional knapsack” problem
in the single-slot case, and so one would hope that it maximizes revenue for the
given bids and budgets, as in the single-slot case. This is not immediately clear,
but does turn out to be true, as we will prove in this section.
As in the single-slot case, the greedy mechanism is not a truthful mecha-
nism. However, we show that it does have a pure-strategy equilibrium, and that
equilibrium has prices and allocation equivalent to the price setting mechanism.
Greedy is Revenue-Maximizing. Consider a revenue-maximizing schedule
that respects both bids and budgets. In this allocation, we can assume wlog that
each bidder i is charged exactly bi per click, since otherwise the allocation can
increase the price for bidder i, reduce ci and remain feasible. Thus, by Lemma 1,
we can find a revenue-maximizing schedule c∗ = (c∗1, . . . , c
∗
n) by maximizing∑
i bici subject to ci ≤ Bi/bi and c1+ . . .+ cℓ ≤ D1+ . . .+Dℓ for all ℓ = 1, ..., n.
Theorem 5. The greedy first-price auction gives a revenue-maximizing sched-
ule.
Price-Setting Mechanism is a Nash Equilibrium of the Greedy First
Price Mechanism. We note that truthfully reporting one’s budget is a weakly
dominant strategy in GFP, since when a bidder is considered for allocation, their
budget is exhausted at a fixed price, subject to a cap on the number of clicks
they can get. Reporting one’s bid truthfully is not a dominant strategy, but we
can still show that there is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium whose outcome is arbitrarily
close to the PS mechanism.
Theorem 6. Suppose the PS mechanism is run on the truthful input, resulting
in clicks c1, . . . , cn for each bidder. Then, for any ǫ > 0 there is a pure-strategy
ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the GFP mechanism where each bidder receives ci±ǫ clicks.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have given a truthful mechanism for assigning bidders to click-
generating slots that respects budget and per-click price constraints. The mech-
anism also respects a scheduling constraint on the slots, using a classical result
from scheduling theory to characterize (and compute) the possible allocations.
We have also proved that the revenue-maximizing mechanism has an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium whose outcome is arbitrarily close to our mechanism. This final re-
sult in some way suggests that our mechanism is the right one for this model. It
would interesting to make this more formal; we conjecture that a general truthful
mechanism cannot do better in terms of revenue.
5.1 Extensions. There are several natural generalizations of the Online Ad
Slot Scheduling problem where it would be interesting to extend our results or
apply the knowledge gained in this paper. We mention a few here.
Click-through rates. In sponsored search (e.g. [9]) it is common for each bidder
to have a personal click-through-rate γi; in our model this would mean that a
bidder i assigned to slot j for a time period of length α would receive αγiDj
clicks. All our results can be generalized to this setting by simply scaling the bids
using b′i = biγi. However, our mechanism in this case does not necessarily prefer
more efficient solutions; i.e., ones that generate more overall clicks. It would be
interesting to analyze a possible tradeoff between efficiency and revenue in this
setting.
Multiple Keywords. To model multiple keywords in our model, we could say
that each query q had its own set of click totals Dq,1 . . . Dq,n, and each bidder
is interested in a subset of queries. The greedy first-price mechanism is easily
generalized to this case: maximally allocate clicks to bidders in order of their bid
bi (at price bi) while respecting the budgets, the query preferences, and the click
commitments to previous bidders. It would not be surprising if there was an
equilibrium of this extension of the greedy mechanism that could be computed
directly with a generalization of the PS mechanism.
Online queries, uncertain supply. In sponsored search, allocations must be made
online in response to user queries, and some of the previous literature has focused
on this aspect of the problem (e.g., [20, 19]). Perhaps the ideas in this paper could
be used to help make online allocation decisions using (unreliable) estimates of
the supply, a setting considered in [19], with game-theoretic considerations.
Acknowledgments. We thank Cliff Stein and Yishay Mansour for helpful dis-
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A Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Theorem 1: For the purposes of this proof, let bidders {1, . . . , n} be
such that b1 ≻ . . . ≻ bn = 0, and consider a new bidder (call her Alice) with
true max-cpc m and true budget B∗.
We first show that reporting the true budget is a weakly dominant strategy
for Alice, for any fixed bid b > 0. Let ℓ be the first bidder with b ≻ bℓ, so
b1 ≻ . . . ≻ bℓ−1 ≻ b ≻ bℓ ≻ . . . ≻ bn. Let B =
∑ℓ−1
i=1 Bi. If B ≥ bD then
the mechanism will not allocate any clicks to Alice, regardless of the reported
budget, since the price will stop before reaching b. If B < bD, we will argue that
Alice’s clicks c are non-increasing in B. Define Bˆ = bD − B > 0.
– If Alice declares B ∈ [Bˆ,∞], then the price will stop at b. She will spend Bˆ
and receive c = Bˆ/b clicks.
– If Alice declares B ∈ [0, Bˆ), then the price will be lower than b, and she will
spend all of her budget. Her final number of clicks will be c = (B/(B + B +R))D,
where R is the total spend of bidders {ℓ, . . . , n}. Since R is non-increasing
in B, we can conclude that c is non-decreasing in B.
Putting together these intervals, we see that c is non-decreasing in B overall,
and since Alice’s total spend is min{B, Bˆ}, we may conclude that it is weakly
dominant to declare B = B∗.
It remains to show that it is weakly dominant for Alice to declare a bid
b = m, given that she declares a budget B = B∗. Let R(b) be the total spend of
bidders {1, . . . , n} given that Alice declares b. Note that R(b) is non-increasing
in b. Let p1 be the price that would result if b =∞, and let p2 be the price that
would result if b = 0. Note that p2 ≤ p1.
– If b ∈ [0, p2) then the price stops at p2 and Alice receives zero clicks.
– If b ∈ (p1,∞], then the price stops at p1, and Alice receives B/p1 clicks.
– If b ∈ [p2, p1], then the price stops at b. To see this, note that if Alice had bid
zero, then the price would have gone down to p2, so it certainly stops at b
or lower. But at price b, the set of bidders that can afford this price consists
of at least all the bidders that could afford price p1, and so we must have
B +
∑
i:bi≻b
Bi ≥ B +
∑
i:bi≥p1
Bi ≥ p1D ≥ bD. Alice thus receives
max
{
0, D −
( ∑
i:bi≻b
Bi/b
)}
(2)
clicks, and we may conclude that in this interval, clicks are non-decreasing
with b.
Note that in the expression (2), plugging in p1 for b yields c = B/p1. Thus we
have that in the interval [p2,∞], clicks are non-decreasing with b, and the price
is always min{b, p1}. We conclude that bidding b = m is a weakly dominant
strategy. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 2: We will show that for sufficiently small ǫ′ > 0, if each
bidder truthfully reports her budget and bids bi = min{mi, p+ ǫ
′} in the GFP
mechanism, then the conditions in the theorem hold.
There are two ways that the PS mechanism (under truthful input) can reach
its last allocated bidder k and final price p: if mk > p ≥ mk+1 and then pD =∑k
i=1Bi (no threshold bidder), or if p = mk (k is a threshold bidder).
In the first case, we have that bidders i ≤ k all have mi > p. Thus in
the supposed equilibrium of GFP, all these bidders are bidding p + ǫ′, and all
bidders i > k are bidding mi ≤ p. Therefore in GFP, each i ≤ k will receive
Bi/(p + ǫ
′) clicks, and the total number of clicks allocated by GFP to bidders
1 . . . k is
∑
i≤k Bi/(p+ ǫ
′) = ( p
p+ǫ′
)D. The remaining D′ = (1− p
p+ǫ
)D clicks, are
allocated to bidders i > k. Bidders 1 . . . k lose clicks by increasing their bid, and
can gain at most D′ clicks by lowering their bid. Bidders i > k will never raise
their bid (since they are bidding mi), and cannot gain more clicks by lowering
their bid. Since D′ can be made arbitrarily small, we have an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
In the second case, p = mk. Let k
′ < k be the last bidder bidding more
than p. In the supposed GFP equilibrium, bidders 1 . . . k′ are bidding p+ ǫ′, and
bidders (k′+1, . . . , k) are bidding mk = p. Thus GFP allocates Bi/(p+ ǫ
′) clicks
to bidders 1 . . . k′, Bi/p clicks to bidders (k
′ + 1, . . . , k − 1) (if any such bidders
exist) and the remaining clicks to bidder k. As in the previous case, no bidder
can gain from raising her bid, the number of clicks that a bidder i ≤ k′ can gain
from lowering her bid can be made arbitrarily small, and no other bidder can
gain from lowering her bid. ⊓⊔
B Proofs for Section 3
Lemma 2. In Find-Price-Block, if Bi = Bi+1, then i cannot be the last slot of
the computed price block.
Proof. Suppose the contrary, namely that i is the last slot of the first price block
and (i+1) is the first slot in the second price block. Denote B = B1+ ...+Bi−1
and D = D1+ ...+Di−1. Then the price of the first price block satisfies (1) p1 =
B+Bi
D+Di
≥ B
D
and (2) p1 =
B+Bi
D+Di
> B+Bi+Bi+1
D+Di+Di+1
. The first condition is equivalent
to Bi
Di
≥ B+Bi
D+Di
, and the second condition is equivalent to B+Bi
D+Di
> Bi+1
Di+1
. The
latter two inequalities imply Bi
Di
> Bi+1
Di+1
, which is a contradiction to the fact that
Bi = Bi+1 and Di > Di+1. ⊓⊔
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3: Suppose bidders 1, . . . , n declare budgets B1 ≥ . . . ≥
Bn, and Alice declares budget B. Let ℓB be the rank of Alice by budget (and
lexicographic order in case of ties) if she bids B. We will prove that the number of
clicks Alice receives is non-increasing as she lowers her declared budget B, which
immediately implies that truthful reporting of budgets is weakly dominant in the
PS mechanism.
Let rBj be the ratio rj assuming Alice bids B; so r
B
k = (B +
∑k−1
i=1 Bi)/
∑k
i=1Di
if ℓB ≤ k, and r
B
k =
∑k
i=1 Bi/
∑k
i=1Di otherwise. For a declared budget B,
let kB be the last slot in the first price block chosen by the mechanism. So,
kB = argmaxk r
B
k (if there are multiple maxima, then kB is the largest lexico-
graphically).
For sufficiently large B > B1, we get that r
B
1 > r
B
k for all k and so kB = 1.
For any such B Alice receives D1 clicks, the most possible. Now as we lower B,
two significant events could occur; we could drop to another bidder’s budget Bi,
or we could have a change in kB, thus changing the set of bidders in the first
block. If neither of these events occur, then Alice remains in the first price block,
but gets a smaller share of the clicks. Thus it remains to cover these two events.
If B = Bi for some i, then note that by Lemma 2, Alice cannot be the
last bidder in the block, so i is in the same block as Alice. Therefore we may
exchange the roles of Alice and bidder i lexicographically (i.e., increase Alice’s
rank by one) and nothing changes.
Now supposeB reaches a point where rk changes because argmaxk r
B
k changes
from kB to k
′. We use k∗ = kB for the remainder of the proof for ease of nota-
tion. At the bid B we have rBk∗ = r
B
k′ . We claim that either k
′ > k∗ or k′ < ℓB.
To see this note that for any k between ℓB and k
∗ we have that rBk decreases at
a rate of 1/(
∑k
i=1Di), which is faster than the rate of the highest ratio r
B
k∗ .
If k′ > k∗ then Alice remains in the first block, but it expands from ending
at k∗ to ending at k′. Both before and after the change in rk, Alice is spending
her entire budget at price rBk∗ = r
B
k′ , so her clicks remain the same.
If k′ < ℓB then Alice would remain in a block ending at slot k
∗, since rBk∗
remains maximum among rBℓB , ..., r
B
n (by the same reasoning about “rate” as
above). Since rBk∗ = r
B
k′ we have that the price of Alice’s block and the first block
will be the same. Since Alice is spending her entire budget before and after the
change in rk at the same price, her clicks remain the same. As we continue to
decrease B beyond this point, we simply remove the bidders and slots from the
first price block, and imagine that we are again in the first price block of a
reduced instance. ⊓⊔
C Proofs for Section 4
Proof Sketch of Theorem 4: We split the proof into two lemmas, showing that
clicks are non-decreasing in both bids and budgets. This immediately implies
the theorem. First we need a small observation about Find-Price-Block:
Lemma 3. Suppose Find-Price-Block is run on a set of budgets B1 ≥ . . . ≥ Bn
and produces a block 1, . . . , ℓ∗ with price p. Then if a bidder is added to the set
with budget B, and Find-Price-Block still produces price p, we must have that
B ≤ Bℓ∗.
Proof. Suppose not. Then B > Bℓ∗ and we have that (B +
∑ℓ∗−1
i=1 Bi)/
∑ℓ∗
i=1Di ≤
p. This contradicts p =
∑ℓ∗
i=1Bi/
∑ℓ∗
i=1Di, since B > Bℓ∗. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. The number of clicks a bidder is allocated is non-decreasing in her
declared budget.
Proof sketch: Let bidders {1, . . . , n} be such that b1 ≻ . . . ≻ bn, and consider a
new bidder Alice with bid bℓ−1 ≻ b ≻ bℓ. We will argue that the number of clicks
that Alice receives is non-increasing as she reduces her declared budget B.
Suppose Alice declares B = ∞ and let Bˆ be the amount she would spend
(Alice would always be a threshold bidder if she declared B =∞). Any declared
budget B ∈ [Bˆ,∞] would result in the same number of clicks, because B is
reduced by the mechanism in step (iii) to Bˆ.
Now as B decreases from Bˆ, two different events could occur: (a) Alice’s price
block threshold ℓ∗ could change (because Find-Price-Block outputs a different
ℓ∗) or (b) the lowest bidder k could change (because running Find-Price-Block
on 1, . . . , k gave a price less than bk+1). For event (a), and between these events,
the arguments from Theorem 3 imply that Alice’s clicks are non-increasing.
For event (b), when the price of the Alice’s block is exactly bk+1, if bidder
k+1 is added, the resulting price output by Find-Price-Block in step (ii) is still
at least bk+1, since adding a bidder cannot reduce the price. Also Lemmas 3
and 2 together imply that Alice is still in the price block chosen in step (iii).
Thus Alice’s clicks do not increase. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. The number of clicks a bidder is allocated is non-decreasing in her
declared bid.
Proof sketch: For the purposes of this proof, let bidders {1, . . . , n} be such that
b1 ≻ . . . ≻ bn, and consider a new bidder (call her Alice) with declared budget
B. We will argue that the number of clicks that Alice receives in non-increasing
with her declared bid b.
Let p1 be the price that Alice would pay if b = ∞, and suppose Alice is in
the jth price block when she bids ∞. Note that for any bid b ∈ (p1,∞], Alice is
still in the jth price block and receives the same number of clicks (B/p1). Let
p2 be the minimum bid required to keep Alice in the jth price block.
We claim that if b ∈ [p2, p1], the price will always be exactly b: no allocation
is made until Alice is considered in step (ii), and when she’s considered, Find-
Price-Block returns a price p ≥ p1, since the set of bidders considered contains
all the bidders who produced price p1. Thus Alice is a threshold bidder, and in
step (iii) Alice’s budget is reduced so that the price is exactly b.
Let kb be the number of bidders with bid bi ≻ b. Let B
b
i be the ith largest
budget among bidders with bid bi ≻ b. We claim that if b ∈ [p2, p1], we have∑ℓ
i=1B
b
i /
∑ℓ
i=1Di < b for all ℓ ≤ kb, since otherwise Alice would not be in the
jth block.
Let Bˆb be Alice’s reduced budget when she bids b ∈ [p2, p1], and let cb = Bˆb/b
denote the number of clicks she receives. To satisfy the price being at most b
in step (iii), we must have that for all ℓ ≤ kb, Bˆb ≤ B
b
ℓ+∆, where ∆ > 0 satisfies
(∆+
∑ℓ
i=1B
b
i )/
∑ℓ
i=1Di = b. In addition, we must have (Bb +
∑kb
i=1 B
b
i )/
∑kb+1
i=1 Di ≤
b. Putting these constraints together we get Bˆb = minℓ≤kb+1{b
∑ℓ
i=1Di−
∑ℓ−1
i=1 B
b
i }
and so
cb = Bˆb/b = min
ℓ≤kb+1
{
ℓ∑
i=1
Di −
1
b
ℓ−1∑
i=1
Bbi
}
.
As b decreases, if the set of bidders with bids ≻ b doesn’t change, then the Bbi s
don’t change, and so this expression implies that cb also decreases. If b decreases
to the point where b′ ≻ b for some new bidder b′, then we claim that cb also
cannot increase. To see this note that for all ℓ, the expression
∑ℓ−1
i=1 B
b
i can
only increase or stay the same if a new bidder is added. We conclude that cb is
non-increasing in the interval b ∈ [p2, p1].
When b decreases to p2, we transition from Alice being in the jth price block
to the j+1st price block. As in Theorem 3, at the point of transition the jth price
block will have the same price as the j + 1st price block, and in both scenarios
Alice spends exactly Bˆp2 . Thus her clicks do not change. We can iterate these
arguments for the j + 1st price block, and so the theorem is proven. ⊓⊔
Lemmas 4 and 5 immediately imply Theorem 4. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 5: Note that an equivalent statement of the constraint c1 +
. . .+ cℓ ≤ D1 + . . .+Dℓ for all ℓ = 1, ..., n. is:∑
i∈S
c′i ≤ D1 + ...+D|S| for all subsets S ⊆ {1, ..., n}. (3)
Suppose bids are b1 ≻ b2 ≻ ... ≻ bn and the corresponding clicks given to
bidders in the greedy allocation are c = (c1, ..., cn). Let c
∗ = (c∗1, ..., c
∗
n) be the
revenue-maximizing solution with the closest prefix to c, meaning that the first
i such that ci 6= c
∗
i is maximized, and modulo that, ci − c
∗
i is minimized.
We shall prove that the greedy c gives a revenue-maximizing schedule. Sup-
pose the contrary and let i be the first index on which c differs from c∗. Note
that ci > c
∗
i (by the definition of greedy, ci is the maximum possible given
c1, ..., ci−1). Let c
∗
max = max{c
∗
i+1, ..., c
∗
n}. Let J = {j > i : c
∗
j = c
∗
max}. Consider
an arbitrary tight constraint on c∗ of the form (3), defined by the set S. We
claim that if i ∈ S, then all j ∈ J are also in S.
Proof of claim: Suppose the contrary, namely that i ∈ S and j /∈ S for some
j ∈ J . Applying (3), we get ∑
ℓ∈S
c∗ℓ =
∑
ℓ≤|S|
Dℓ. (4)
One of the bidders in S must have index m > i, otherwise (3) would be violated
for c and S by
∑
ℓ∈S⊆{1,...,i} cℓ >
∑
ℓ∈S⊆{1,...,i} c
∗
ℓ =
∑
ℓ≤|S|Dℓ. If m /∈ J , then
we would violate (3) for the set S′ = S ∪ {j}\{m}:
∑
ℓ∈S′ c
∗
ℓ >
∑
ℓ∈S c
∗
ℓ =∑
ℓ≤|S|=|S′|Dℓ. Therefore m ∈ J .
Now by the feasibility of c∗ and the fact that j /∈ S, we also have c∗j +∑
ℓ∈S c
∗
ℓ ≤ D|S|+1 +
∑
ℓ≤|S|Dℓ which implies, together with (4), that c
∗
j ≤
D|S|+1. Again by feasibility, we also have
∑
ℓ∈S\m c
∗
ℓ ≤
∑
ℓ≤|S|−1Dℓ and this,
together with (4), gives c∗m ≥ D|S|. Putting these last two observations together
yields D|S| ≤ cm = c
∗
max = c
∗
j ≤ D|S|+1. Unless cm = c
∗
max = c
∗
j = 0, this
violates the distinctness of the non-zero Dj ’s. But if c
∗
max = 0, it means that all
cℓ for ℓ > i have cℓ = 0, which means that c gives strictly more clicks than c
∗,
a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Let j be an arbitrary member of J . By the claim, there is an ǫ > 0 such that
if we set c′ = c∗ except c′i = c
∗
i + ǫ and c
′
j = c
∗
j − ǫ, we get a feasible allocation
c′, since j appears in every tight constraint in which i appears. This allocation
has revenue at least that of c∗, since bi ≥ bj . But, it has a closer prefix to c than
c∗, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Proof Sketch of Theorem 6: We will abuse notation and let ǫ′ denote any positive
quantity that can be made arbitrarily close to zero. When the PS mechanism is
run on the truthful input, let p1 > p2 > . . . denote the prices of each block. We
will show that if in GFP each bidder i truthfully reports her budget and bids
bi = min{mi, pj + ǫ
′}, where j is the price block of i in the PS mechanism, we
meet the conditions of the theorem.
Suppose the first price block is determined when bidder k is considered, and
ends at slot ℓ∗ ≤ k. The price p1 satisfies mk+1 ≤ p1 ≤ mk. Let P ⊆ [k] denote
the bidders in the first block (the ones in [k] with the ℓ∗ highest budgets). Also,
we have that all i ∈ P spend their entire budget in the PS mechanism, except
possibly k, who may spend less than her budget if mk = p1. We now argue that
GFP will produce the same allocation as the PS mechanism for this price block.
For all i ∈ P we have bi = min{mi, p1 + ǫ
′} ≥ min{mk, p1} = p1. All bidders
i ∈ ([k] \ P ) have bi ≤ p2 + ǫ
′ < p1. All bidders i /∈ [k] have mi ≺ mk and so
since bi ≤ mi we get bi ≺ bi′ for all i
′ ∈ P . We conclude that the bidders in P
are the first to be considered by the GFP mechanism. Furthermore, if k ∈ P ,
and Bk is reduced in the PS mechanism (because k is a threshold bidder), then
we must have bk = mk = p1, and so bk ≺ bi for all i ∈ P, i 6= k. Thus in this
case bidder k is the last bidder in P to be considered by GFP. From here it is
straightforward to show that GFP will assign the first ℓ∗ slots to the bidders in
P (almost) exactly like the PS mechanism does, with at least ci − ǫ
′ clicks to
each i ∈ P ; the mechanism will have ǫ′ clicks left over, which will be assigned to
bidders not in P . Applying this same argument to subsequent price blocks, we
conclude that GFP will assign c′i = ci ± ǫ
′ clicks to all bidders i.
To show this is an equilibrium, consider a bidder Alice (call her “bidder a”)
that was assigned to price block j∗ and received c′a = ca± ǫ
′ clicks. If Alice spent
within ǫ′ of her entire budget, it means she would not want to raise her bid,
since she could not possibly receive more than ǫ′ additional clicks. If she did not
spend her budget, then from the observations above we know that she is bidding
her true max-cpc ma, and therefore also does not want to raise her bid.
It remains to show that Alice does not want to lower her bid. Let ℓj denote
the last slot in price block j. Let Pj denote the set of bidders in price block j.
Alice’s current bid ba is at least pj , and if she keeps her bid above pj her clicks
will remain ca±ǫ from the arguments above. Let S = ∪j≤j∗Pj . If Alice lowers her
bid to b′a < pj, then all bidders i ∈ S besides Alice will have bi ≻ b
′
a. Thus when
Alice is considered by the greedy algorithm, her clicks will be constrained by the
commitments to these bidders. Furthermore each of these bidders will still receive
at least c′i clicks. For all price blocks j, we have
∑
i∈Pj
c′i ≥
∑ℓj
i=ℓj−1+1
Di − ǫ
′.
Thus
∑
i∈S,i6=a c
′
i ≥ (
∑ℓj∗
i=1Di) − ǫ
′ − c′a. Since S has size ℓj∗ , this implies that
the constraint (3) restricts Alice’s clicks to at most c′a + ǫ
′. ⊓⊔
